
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Approved for Release 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975A020000080002-9 25X1 INDIA-PAKISTAN: Both countries continue to prepare for a possible outbreak of hostilities. Pakistani officials 25X1 still predict an Indian attack on East Pakistan before the end of September 25X1 They foresee a defensive war for Pakistani forces in the East wing, while the armed forces in West Pakistan launch a counteroffensive across the Indian border. The Pakistani military high command is described as on full alert, and some troops have been moved to forward positions near the border.

some villages in the border area nave peen 25X1 evacuated, and blackout arrangements have been instituted at military establishments. Moreover, certain key installations are being sandbagged and air raid shelter ditches near these installations are being dug. The Pakistanis also claim to have reports confirming that the Indian military establishment is fully prepared for war with all leaves for personnel canceled. The Pakistanis further claim that the Indian Air Force has moved aircraft to forward bases near the Pakistani borders. There is confirmation that India has initiated a restrictive leave policy, but there is no evidence that the Indians have moved aircraft to border areas. The Pakistani reports are in line with earlier reports from Islamabad that Pakistani leaders expect India to launch an attack between early September and mid-October. There is no indication that New Delhi intends to initiate hostilities, but each side has recently taken steps that, while essentially defensive in nature, could be viewed by the other side as preparations for an attack. 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1 17 Sep 71

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UN-JERUSALEM: Jordan's failure to present a draft resolution at yesterday's Security Council sessions on Jerusalem stemmed from its inability to marshal sufficient Arab backing.

At meetings of Arab delegates on Thursday several of the representatives spoke out strongly against the resolution Jordan had worked out with the US, denouncing it as totally unacceptable. The more radical Arab states, led by Council nonpermanent member Syria, want to stiffen the text at several critical points. Most Arab delegations now believe that, since Jerusalem has been raised in the Council, they must try to win majority approval of some resolution on the subject--regardless of any Western veto. Reports indicate, however, that intra-Arab agreement on a proposed text may not be possible before the end of next week.

The Council is scheduled to hear additional speakers on Jerusalem today, and it may then put off for several days its consideration of this item. The delay would give the Arabs time to attempt to resolve their differences and would also ensure higher-level representation at subsequent meetings, since several foreign ministers are en route to New York for Tuesday's opening of the General Assembly. Clouding the picture is last night's speech of Egyptian President Sadat, who advocated a convening of the Council to consider the entire Middle

East issue.

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LEGYPT: President Sadat last night called for a foreign minister - level Security Council session "at some stage" so the international community can "shoulder its responsibility" toward the Middle East dispute.

In a nationwide address, the Egyptian President deplored the failure of the United States to define its own position on a settlement of the dispute and claimed that the Americans had even given up their role as "mailman" between Egypt and Israel. He several times accused the US of "deception and misleading" in its portrayal of the positions of Egypt and Israel, and he gave a point-by-point refutation of what he termed Washington's misrepresentation of Egypt's terms for an interim and a general settlement.

Although Egypt had agreed to a period of quiet diplomacy by the US, "no contact whatsoever had taken place between us and the United States" since 6 July and US-Egyptian relations had been at a standstill, he said. Egypt had used this period to put its own house in order, but "there is a limit to everything" and the time had come, he declared, to tell the truth to the world and the United Nations. He had therefore instructed his foreign minister to go to New York to explain Egypt's position, and he called on the Secretary General and Ambassador Jarring to make their own reports. Eventually, Sadat said, he wanted the Security Council to convene at the foreign ministers level so that everyone, including the US, could "define its attitude."

Dwelling at length on the political, economic and social reforms that he had put in motion at home, Sadat said these were not diversions or ends in themselves but a necessary foundation for "the battle." He repeated that 1971 would be decisive "whether through peace or fighting," but he made it clear that building the domestic foundation will be a "long road."

In its initial report on the speech, the Soviet news agency made no reference to Sadat's call for a Security Council session and termed his discussion of domestic political reorganization the main theme of his speech. The report dealt perfunctorily and in low key with Sadat's criticism of the US position in the Middle East dispute.

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